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ABSTRACT: Using detailed data at the local level on the number of calls to the 
domestic violence emergency hotline in Spain, we study the effect of the COVID-19 
outbreak and the quarantine measures imposed on the help-seeking behavior of intimate 
partner violence victims. Our analysis focuses on Spain, which is one of the European 
countries that was most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a consequence, 
implemented one of the strictest quarantine policies in Europe. We find that the 
implementation of the lockdown policy was associated with a 41 percentage point 
increase in the number of calls to the emergency hotline compared to the pre-policy 
period. This effect was stronger during the strict confinement period but persisted in the 
medium term, after quarantine was lifted. Using detailed mobile phone data to measure 
mobility levels, we document stronger effects in provinces whose effective mobility 
reduction was more intense. Our results are crucial from a policy perspective, as many 
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The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in almost all countries in the world will have extensive 
consequences both economically and socially and some of those are already being documented. 
The risk of a second and maybe stronger and longer wave of the pandemic calls for research to be 
done in a timely manner so as to inform policy makers of the best and most protective policies to 
be implemented if those risks end up materializing. One of the areas that are currently being 
studied is the impact of the pandemic on domestic violence, as the number of domestic violence 
calls has greatly risen in several countries in the past few months, following the pandemic 
outbreak.  
The pre-existing body of literature suggests that the pandemic outbreak and its consequences may 
have played a major role in the rise of domestic violence calls. First, because of the economic 
instability and changes in economic opportunities which followed the pandemic outbreak, and 
have been shown to be important determinants of violence within households in several papers 
(Aizer, 2010; Anderberg et al., 2016); Lockdown type policies, on the other hand, are likely to 
affect IPV through the emotional cues that they generate (Card and Dahl, 2011)1, increased 
exposure to perpetrators, social isolation, and the increased time spent at home of men2.  
Since the outbreak of the pandemic, a growing number of researchers have been investigating the 
impact of the COVID-19 on intimate partner violence with mixed evidence on the magnitude of its 
effect and the specific role of the lockdown type policies3. Using data from 14 US cities during the 
COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, Leslie and Wilson (Leslie and Wilson, 2020) measure an 7.5% 
increase in reported domestic violence and argue that social distancing, rather than economic 
instability, is the main driver of the rise in domestic violence calls4. The fact that the study is 
limited to calls to the emergency hotline in cities might however affect the external validity of this 
result to other contexts.  
 
 
1 See also the psychiatric study by Mazza et al on the specific role of the lockdown-type policies in generating 
feelings of frustration and agitation, which in turn fosters the rise of aggressive behavior towards partners, 
children and the elderly (Mazza et al., 2020) 
2 Lindo et al. provide evidence of an increase in the incidence of domestic violence   following men’s increase 
of stay-at-home time after lay-off (Lindo, Schaller and Hansen, 2018).  
3 Peterman et al., 2020; Arenas-Arroyo, Fernandez-Kranz and Nollenberger, 2020; Beland et al., 2020; 
Campedelli, Aziani and Favarin, 2020; Kumar and Nayar, 2020; Leslie and Wilson, 2020; Piquero et al., 2020 
4 According to the researchers, the fact that the increase is concentrated in the first weeks following social 




Using Facebook-relayed survey data on approximately 9,000 women residing in Spain and living 
with their male partner between May and June5,  Arroyo et al. (Arenas-Arroyo, Fernandez-Kranz 
and Nollenberger, 2020) find that the pandemic outbreak caused a 23 percentage point increase 
in episodes of intimate partner violence – both reported and unreported- which is higher than 
previous estimates. They also find that the role of the economic stress on IPV is almost twice as 
large as the effect of the lockdown policy. 
Therefore, our paper contributes to this new and growing literature on the impact of the COVID-
19 on domestic violence, more specifically on the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims. Like 
Arroyo et al. (2020), our study country is Spain, which was intensively affected by both the 
pandemic as well as the imposition of mobility restrictions. Following Leslie et al., we exploit 
administrative level data on the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims to estimate the magnitude 
of the effects of the pandemic in this country. We depart from their methodology by studying 
changes in the help-seeking behavior on the entire country of study (not just cities), and by 
considering the role of regional differences in effective mobility using a novel database to explain 
the increase in the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims that we document.   While the use of 
province-level administrative data has certain limitations, which the use of survey based data can 
overcome (Arenas-Arroyo et al., 2020)6, we argue that using such information is crucial to 
properly measure the magnitude of the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In that sense, 
our paper complements the evidence brought forward by Arenas-Arroyo et al. by looking at a 
different aspect of domestic violence – the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims – on the entire 
Spanish territory.  
We focus on Spain, which is one of the European countries which was most affected by the COVID-
19 pandemic in terms of the number of confirmed cases and deaths. The Carlos III Health Institute 
estimated that the pandemic was responsible for an excess of 43,985 more deaths over the period 
between the 13th of March and 1st of August, compared to the previous years 7.  
 
 
5 The survey was carried out between May 17th and June 12th and distributed by Facebook using the tool 
“boost post”, targeting women residing in Spain aged between 18 and 60 years old. 13,789 women 
completed the survey, among which 8,951 had a male partner and were coexisting with him.  
6 We are only able to measure reported episodes of violence and we cannot disentangle the effect of 
economic distress from that of lockdown 





The impact of the pandemic varied significantly across the Spanish territory. At the peak of the 
pandemic, the most strongly hit Autonomous Communities (CC.AA)8, Madrid and Catalonia, 
suffered approximately 10 times more cases and deaths per 100,000 inhabitants due to COVID-
19 than the relatively preserved CC.AA of Andalucía and Asturias9.  
As an attempt to control the spread of the virus, the state of emergency was declared on the 14th 
of March and national confinement entered in effect the following day. Spain’s quarantine 
measures were among the strictest implemented across the countries hit by the COVID-19 
pandemic: while the majority of countries maintained authorization to go outside for physical 
activity or stroll around, even at the highest peak of the pandemic (particularly for families with 
children), in the Spanish case this was not allowed until two months later, during the 1st phase of 
the deconfinement measures10. 
Therefore, in this paper we make use of detailed province-level monthly administrative data on 
domestic violence calls and exploit regional differences in terms of mobility restrictions during 
quarantine in order to estimate the effect of the pandemic on the help-seeking behavior of 
domestic violence victims. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the quarantine policies on the 
help-seeking behavior of victims in the short and medium term. We find that, once we control for 
province and month fixed-effects, the introduction of the lockdown policy is responsible for a 41 
percentage point (hereafter pp) increase in the number of domestic violence calls per 100,000 
inhabitants. This effect is stronger in provinces in which mobility was most intensely restricted, 
from 30 to 38 pp higher than in other provinces.  
Because of the forced proximity introduced by the stay-at-home policy, potential victims might 
not be able to reach out for help when facing a dangerous situation, which suggests that our 
estimates might underestimate victims’ help-seeking attempts for domestic abuse. Our results are 
robust to excluding non-victim reporting from domestic violence calls, which provides evidence 
 
 
8 Spain is composed of 17 regions called Autonomous Communities (CC.AA), two Autonomous cities (Ceuta 
and Melilla) and 52 provinces. 
9 According to the Spanish Health Ministry, on the 17th of May the number of confirmed cases per 100,000 
inhabitants reached 995 in Madrid and 727 in Catalonia, while other regions such as Andalucía and Asturias 
remained relatively preserved from the pandemic with “only” 147 and 231 confirmed cases per 100,000 
inhabitants.  
10 See Section 8.1 in the appendix for more details on the lockdown measures and progressive 




that our results are not driven by third-party reporting which might increase with time spent at 
home.  
When we use as explanatory variables either the COVID-19 incidence or the mortality rates at the 
regional level, we find no effects of any of these two health indicators on help seeking behavior. 
Thus, we conclude that the observed increase in calls to the helpline represents a response to the 
lockdown measures and the following reductions in mobility levels rather than a response to the 
contagion and mortality differences across regions in Spain.   
We believe that these results are important from a policy perspective, not only for the health and 
economic consequences for the women but also for the negative intergenerational impacts on the 
children exposed to the violence at home.  
In view of the recent increases in the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in several countries 
around the world, governments should consider implementing measures to protect intimate 
partner violence victims and to speed up the processes for those women to gain an independent 
life away from their abusers.   
2 Data 
2.1 Help-seeking behavior  
We use as indicator of help-seeking behavior of IPV victims the number of calls to the emergency 
hotline 016 (Government Office on Gender-based violence). The number of calls is available for 
each province at a monthly interval, for each year between 2008 and 2020. The latest available 
month for 2020 is July. Additionally, the data allows us to identify the calls according to the type 
of person making the call: the victim, a family member of the victim, or outside of the family 
reporting.  
Our variable of interest is the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants, which we measure at the 
province – monthly level between January 2019 and July 2020. We denote 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 the total 
number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants in province p, year y and month m.  Descriptive statistics 
on the monthly number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants over the entire Spanish territory are 
presented in the annexes (Table  a). 
In our main specification, we consider the total number of calls regardless of the person making 
the call. In section 5 we present additional analyses were we only consider calls from IPV victims 




2.2 Mobility  
The Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) created a novel mobility data base using mobile 
phone information provided by the three main phone operators in Spain with the aim of tracking 
population movements in the context of the pandemic.  
This mobility data base contains daily information on the share of the mobile population at the 
province and CC.AA level, between March 16th and June 2020th11. For each considered 
geographical level, the mobile population is defined as the population which left the residential 
area for more than 2 hours between 10am and 16pm. The INE also shared information on the 
share of the mobile population during a reference period - the week 18th of November 2019- at all 
geographical levels, in order to provide a reference point for the mobility data during the 
pandemic outbreak.  On the day following the national lock-down policy (16th of March), the share 
of the mobile population dropped by 40% compared to the reference week (and reached the level 
of 13%) (see Figure  a in the annexes).   
While formal mobility was equally restricted on the entire Spanish territory during the initial 
phase of the lockdown measures, effective mobility restriction differed across Spanish CC.AA 
between March and the beginning of May (see Figure  m and Figure  n in the annexes). Those 
differences are strongly linked to the differential spread of the pandemic across the Spanish 
territory: those CC.AA which were the most impacted by the pandemic (in terms of the highest 
number of cases, deaths, health facilities saturation) were also the ones in which the population 
was less mobile, either because of a stronger enforcement of the confinement measures by the 
local police or because of a stricter quarantine compliance by the population due to the fears of 
being infected/spreading the virus. Differences in mobility can also steam from pre-pandemic 
regional mobility differences in terms of demographic characteristics; labor market structure 
(higher share of essential workers); urbanization and density (see Figure  l for pre-policy 
differences in terms of mobility).  
Continuous mobility index 
We construct two mobility indicators from the INE mobility database. The first indicator is the 
continuous mobility index (CMI), which is defined at the province and monthly level and captures 
the effective mobility restriction across provinces and time. It is equal to the difference between 
 
 




the monthly share of the mobile population during month m, with the share of the mobile 
population during the reference period12.   
A negative value of 𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝,𝑚 indicates a lower mobility in province p and month m compared to 
pre-COVID levels (in November 2019). The lowest negative mobility indexes reflect a high 
intensity mobility restriction, whereas mobility indexes of values close to 0 reflect a low intensity 
mobility restriction compared to pre-COVID levels. Descriptive statistics of the monthly share of 
the mobile population and the continuous mobility index at the national level are presented in the 
annexes, Table b. 
The comparability of the continuous mobility indexes across time is limited by the fact that 
mobility data is not available for the months prior to the implementation of confinement. For this 
reason, we define a second discrete mobility indicator, which varies across provinces but is fixed 
over time for a given province.  
Discrete mobility indexes 
The discrete mobility index (𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝) is defined based on provinces’ average value of the mobility 
restriction index between March and June 2020, 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝. It takes the value of 1 for provinces with 
the lowest values of 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝 (or highest mobility restriction intensity), and 0 otherwise. We use 
two different definitions of the discrete mobility index, depending on the threshold used to classify 
provinces in the low or high intensity mobility restriction groups.  
The first threshold that we use is the average value of 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼 over all provinces: provinces with 
low mobility during confinement (below average) are considered as high mobility restriction 
intensity provinces.  The second threshold is the lowest 25th percentile of 𝐴𝐶𝑀I over all provinces. 
In this case, very high intensity mobility restriction provinces are compared to low and average 
mobility restriction intensity provinces13. The composition of the mobility restriction intensity 
groups according to both definitions (below average, low 25%) is presented in the annexes, Table  
c. 
2.3 COVID-19 number of cases and mortality 
We use information from the INE and the Carlos III Health Institute (ISCIII) to identify the number 
of new confirmed COVID-19 cases and the excess in deaths during the pandemic – as compared to 
 
 
12 The formal definition of the continuous mobility index is provided in the annexes, section 8.2 




2019 - per province and month between March 2020 and July 202014. We hereafter denote 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷1 the number of new confirmed cases per 100,000 inhabitants, and 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷2 the excess in 
deaths between 2020 and 2019 for all causes of mortality. 
The peak of the pandemic in terms of the new number of COVID-19 cases was registered on the 
20th of March, that is 5 days after lockdown implementation (Figure  b). The highest number of 
estimated deaths due to COVID-19 was registered 10 days after the peak in the number of cases, 
on the 1st of April (2 893, see Figure  c).  
3 Methodology 
Our identification strategies rely on province-level high frequency (monthly) data on the help-
seeking behavior of IPV victims, mobility, and health outcomes. We proceed in our analyses in 
three parts. We first investigate the impact of the confinement policy on the help-seeking behavior 
of IPV victims using a difference-in-differences strategy (DiD) for the entire Spanish territory. 
Even though the confinement policy was implemented nationally, population movements were 
not equally restricted across the territory, either because of differences in population compliance, 
or because of a number of structural differences (economic or geographic). Therefore, the second 
part of our methodology consists in investigating the extent to which province-level differences 
in terms of mobility explain differences in the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims.  Finally, we 
investigate whether regional differences in terms of help-seeking behavior could alternatively be 
explained by differences in the health effects of the virus (positive cases and mortality indicators) 
rather than differences in mobility.  
A potential threat to the proper identification of the impact of COVID-19 on the help-seeking 
behavior of IPV victims could steam from changes in third-party reporting, rather than changes in 
domestic violence and help-seeking behavior of IPV victims, in a context where neighbors are 
more likely to be the witness of domestic violence. We address this potential issue in the last 
section of this paper.   
3.1 The effect of the national-level quarantine measures 
We first estimate the impact of the confinement policy on the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims, 
using province-level and monthly data on the number of calls to 016 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
 
 




2019 and 2020, between January and July. By comparing the province-level observations in 2020 
to observations in 2019, we are able to account for the role of seasonality in explaining the changes 
in the help-seeking behavior following the lockdown.  
We run the following model:  
(1)    𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑦 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 
With 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants in province p, year y and month m; 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚 an indicator which is equal to 1 for the months of April, May, June and July, 0.5 for March, 
0 for January and February for each of the two years included in the analysis; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑦 a treatment 
dummy which is equal to 1 for 2020 (which corresponds to the year of the outbreak); 𝛽𝐷𝐷 is the 
DiD estimator, which captures the impact of the confinement policy on the help-seeking 
behavior of IPV victims in Spain.  We include province fixed-effects to account for any time-
invariant characteristics of provinces such as demographic characteristics, and month fixed-
effects to account for national time-varying characteristics. 
In alternative specifications, we control for the estimated deaths due to COVID-19 per 100,000 
inhabitants; include province-linear time trends to control for any within provincial 
characteristics that vary over time; run the model at the regional rather than provincial level; 
reduce the time-frame of the analysis. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the 
province-level15 (regional level in the regional analysis).  
We also use an event-study model to identify the dynamics of the impact of the quarantine policy 
on the evolution of the number of calls to 016 as follows:  
(2)  𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,y,𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2020𝑚 + ∑ 𝜕𝑖
4
𝑖=−1





Where 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑖) is the i-th month before/after March – month of the implementation policy in 
2020. The 𝜕𝑖 coefficients capture the month-fixed effects (from February to July). The base month, 
which is omitted in the regression, is January. The 𝜆𝑖 coefficients of the interaction terms between 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2020 and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑖) capture the change in the number of calls for this month between 2020 
 
 




and 2019, with respect to the change between 2020 and 2019 for the month of January.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the province-level. 
3.2 Mobility 
Our second identification strategy exploits the variation in mobility restriction intensity across 
time (following the deconfinement phases) and across Spanish provinces - due to differences in 
population compliance, police enforcement, demographic characteristics, etc. We investigate 
whether province-level differences in mobility restrictions between November 2019 and July 
2020 (June for the continuous variable model) explain the variability in the number of calls to 016 
per 100,000 inhabitants.  
Continuous mobility variable models 
Our first specification exploits the continuous mobility variable 𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝,𝑚. Due to the limitations on 
the availability of mobility data, our study period comprises the month of November 2019 for the 
pre-COVID period, and the months of March, April, May and June 2020 for the pandemic period. 
We therefore run our continuous mobility analysis on an unbalanced dataset with November 2019 
being the 1st study period, March 2020 the 5th study period, etc.  
(3)    𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑚 = 𝛼 + β𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝,𝑚 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑚 
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑚 is the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants in province p and month m; as we only 
have information on mobility data for November 2019 and March, April, May and June 2020, the 
months considered are translated in calendar months, with m=1 for November 2019, m=5 for 
March 2020, etc.;  𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝,𝑚 is equal to the continuous mobility indicator of province p during month 
m, that is to the difference in percentage points between mobility registered in November 2019 
and the considered month m. It therefore takes a value of 0 for m=1, and a negative value for m=5, 
6, etc.  
We include province fixed-effects to account for any time-unvarying characteristics of provinces 
(such as demographic characteristics) and month fixed-effects to account for national time-
varying characteristics. In alternative specifications, we control for the estimated deaths due to 




regional characteristics that vary over time; reduce the time-frame of the analysis. In all 
specifications, standard errors are clustered at the province-level16.  
Discrete mobility variable models 
In the continuous variable model, we are only able to use information for November 2019, and 
from March to June 2020. The fact that our dataset is unbalanced might affect the power and 
interpretability of our results. Therefore, we next consider a discrete mobility index 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 which 
is a dummy variable that distinguishes provinces according to those most affected by mobility 
restriction during confinement, and those least affected by mobility restriction during 
confinement. For this model we exploit continuous information on the number of calls per 
100,000 inhabitants between November 2019 and July 2020. The following regression is run for 
the two definitions of the discrete mobility index 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 (below average mobility/ low 25% 
mobility):  
(4)    𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,y,𝑚 = 𝛼 + Post𝑦,𝑚 + β𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜆𝑦 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 
𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 is the discrete mobility index, which is equal to 1 for provinces with the highest mobility 
restriction intensity during confinement, and 0 for the other provinces17.  𝛽 is our coefficient of 
interest which captures the differential effect of the outbreak of the COVID-19 on the help-seeking 
behavior of IPV victims for provinces with higher mobility restriction, compared to other 
provinces (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝)18. We also include time (month and year) fixed effects in the regression, 
𝜃𝑚 and 𝜆𝑦. In alternative specifications, we control for the estimated deaths due to COVID-19 per 
100,000 inhabitants; include region-linear time trends to control for any within region 
characteristics that vary over time; expand the time-frame of the analysis. 
We also run an event-study model to evaluate the dynamics of this restriction effect overtime, 
according to the following equation:  
 
 
16 Due to the lower number of observations in the mobility models compared to the difference-in-
differences strategy, we do not run the analyses at the regional level as an alternative specification. For the 
same reason, in the alternative specification which uses linear time trends, we choose to define the trends 
at the regional rather than province level to limit the number of variables included in the model.   
17 Post𝑦,𝑚 is a time variable indicating the occurrence of the confinement and equals 1 from April to July 
2020, 0.5 for March 2020 and 0 for all other months. 
18 The effect of belonging to either of the group is captured by the province-fixed effects 𝛾𝑝, which is why we 





(5)     𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
4
𝑖=−7
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑖) 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝜕𝑚 +  𝜆𝑦 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑦,𝑚 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑖) is the i-th month before/after the implementation of the confinement policy. The 
regression is run on data from March 2019 to July 2020 (17 time periods). We restrict the number 
of lags to 7, and the number of leads to 4, from August 2019 to July 2020. Previous time periods 
(from March 19 to July 19) are used as baseline to interpret the event study estimates. For each 
month i, the 𝛾𝑖  capture the effect of belonging to the high mobility restriction intensity group on 
the number of calls, with respect to the reference period.   𝜕𝑚 captures the month-fixed effects for 
all the 17 time periods. 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 is the discrete mobility index, which is equal to 1 for provinces with 
the highest mobility restriction intensity during confinement, and 0 for the other provinces19. 
Standard errors are clustered at the province-level. 
3.3 Incidence of COVID-19 and help-seeking behavior at the local level 
For the last part of our analysis, we investigate whether the province-level differences in terms of 
the incidence of calls to 016 during the pandemic outbreak can be attributed to the level of COVID-
19 related cases/deaths in each province. We run the following regression on province-monthly 
level observations between March and July 2020:  
(6)    𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷
𝑖
𝑝,𝑚 + 𝛾𝑝 + 𝜃𝑚 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑚 
With 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑖={𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷1 : number of new confirmed cases,  𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷2 ∶ excess in deaths between 
2020 and 2019 for all causes of mortality}. 𝛽 is our coefficient of interest: it captures the health 
effect of the pandemic on the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims. We control for province (𝛾𝑝) 
year (𝜆𝑦) and month (𝜃𝑚) fixed-effects. In alternative specifications, we also include region-linear 
time to control for any within regional characteristics that vary over time and reduce the time-




19 The effect of belonging to either of the group is captured by the province-fixed effects 𝛾𝑝, which is why we 





4.1 The effect of the national-level quarantine measures 
Main specifications 
Figure 1 below plots the evolution of the monthly calls to 016 in Spain between January and July, 
in 2019 (blue dotted line) and 2020 (blue line) and provides suggestive support for the existence 
of a common trend of the number of calls to 016 in pre-policy months (January and February), in 
2019 and 2020. After the policy in 2020, the number of calls to 016 increases by 65% between 
February and April, against a very small increase in 2019 between the same months.  
Figure 1- Calls to 016 and calls per 100,000 inhabitants per month, in 2020 and 2019 
 
Source: Government Office on Gender-based Violence.  
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (vertical red line), and 
partially lifted on the 18th of May. The number of calls indicated each month corresponds to the 
total number of calls at the end of the month.  
Results presented in Table 1 indicate a strong and positive effect of the introduction of the 
confinement policy across all provinces. In 2020, the introduction of the reform caused an 
increase of 3.5 calls per 100,000 inhabitants, which represents an increase of 40.7 pp as compared 
to the pre-policy period20. This result is robust to alternative specifications.  
Table 1 - Effect of the implementation of the national confinement policy on the number of calls 
per 100,000 inhabitants, difference-in-differences estimates 
 
 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Specifications Main model Controlling 











3.52*** 3.51*** 3.52*** 3.76*** 4.10*** 
(0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.57) (0.46) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒎 
1.29*** 1.29*** 1.39*** 1.38*** 1.43*** 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.32) (0.29) 
𝑻 
0.25 0.24 0.44 0.20 0.02 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.22) (0.31) 
 𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑 
 0.00    
 (0.00)    
Intercept 
8.98*** 8.99*** 20.51*** 9.39*** 8.33*** 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.27) 
Observations 727 727 727 266 519 
R2 0.423 0.423 0.544 0.559 0.455 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Regional FE No No No Yes No 






𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕 is an indicator which is equal to 1 for the months between April and July; 05 for March; 0 otherwise. 𝑻 
is the treatment dummy which is equal to 1 for the year 2020. The DiD coefficient (𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒎𝑻) is indicated in 
bold for all specifications. 𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑 is the excess in between 2020 and 2019 for all causes of mortality in 
province p during month m. Standard errors are clustered at the province (or regional) level.  
Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; +10% 
Note: In February 2020, the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants was equal to 8.6. 
 
Event study estimates 
Results from the event study model - equation (2) - point to a large and persistent effect of the 
quarantine measures on the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims (Figure 2). The coefficient for 
one month prior to the reform not statistically different from 0. From March 2020 onwards, the 
coefficients are large in magnitude and statistically different from 0 at the 1% level.  
As quarantine was implemented on the 15th of March, only half of this month should be considered 
as treated. This explains why the largest dynamic effect is measured in the following month, April, 
during which the Spanish territory was under strict lockdown for the entire month.  The effect of 
the policy then decreases at 3.4 in May when confinement measures were relaxed, remains at high 
level in June (3.3) and then decreases at 2.2 in July.  
The persistent effect of the policy after strict confinement was lifted could be explained by an 
inertia of violence, whereby violent conflict in the household is more likely to occur once previous 




strict quarantine was lifted, when they are more likely to be away from their partner. Part of the 
persisting effect in the post-policy months could also steam from the degraded and stressful 
economic conditions that followed the pandemic outbreak. While economic factors likely play a 
role in the prevalence of domestic violence and, consequently, on the magnitude of the effects that 
we are measuring, we interpret the decreasing dynamic effect of the policy on the help-seeking 
behavior of IPV victims as a combination of the improvement in the economic environment as well 
as the relaxation of the forced proximity situation imposed by the quarantine measures.   
Figure 2 - Event study estimates of the impact of the national confinement policy on the number of 
calls per 100,000 inhabitants
 
Note: coefficient estimates are indicated for each lag/lead around the confinement 
implementation (t) indicated as a vertical red line. Confidence interval (95%) are plotted (light 
green bars) around each coefficient.  
4.2 Mobility 
While confinement was implemented nationally, mobility was not equally restricted across the 
Spanish territory due to differences in population compliance, share of essential workers, 
demographic characteristics, etc. We now exploit the variation in mobility restriction intensity 
across provinces and investigate whether they are translated into differences in help-seeking 
behavior.  
A simple linear fit of the relationship between the calls per 100,000 inhabitants and our 




seeking behavior and the share of the mobile population – or, said differently, a positive 
correlation between help-seeking behavior and mobility restriction. 
We now formally quantify the extent of the correlation between mobility restriction intensity and 
help-seeking behavior once we account for any time-unvarying province specific characteristics 
and seasonal effects (equation (3)). 
We find a strong and significant negative effect of the share of the mobile population on the 
number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants (Table 2): a 1 percentage point increase in mobility 
causes a decrease of 0.19 calls per 100,000 inhabitants. According to this estimation, the decrease 
in mobility that we observed between November 2019 and March 202021 caused an increase of 
+3.3 calls per 100,000 inhabitants as compared to November 2019. This is equivalent to an 
increase by 33.0 pp in the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants compared to November 201922.  
 
 
21 -17.4 percentage points on average over all provinces. See Table  a in the annexes. 
22 a 1 pp increase in mobility causes a -0.19 decrease in the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants. A 17.4 
pp decrease therefore causes to a -0.19x-17.4 = 3.3 increase in the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants. 




Table 2 - Estimation of the impact of mobility on the number of calls to 016 per 100,000 
inhabitants, continuous mobility index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








-0.19+ -0.18+ -0.16 -0.24* 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
 𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑   
 -0.01   
 (0.01)   
Intercept 
10.19*** 10.18*** 10.33*** 10.17*** 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.33) (0.28) 
Observations 259 259 259 156 
R2 0.397 0.400 0.451 0.390 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes -0.24* 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes (0.10) 
Time frame Nov 19; March-July 20 
Nov 19; April-
June 20 
𝑪𝑴𝑰𝒎,𝒑 is the continuous mobility index, which is our variable of interest (highlighted in bold in 
all specificatio𝒏 𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑  is the excess in deaths in 2020 compared to 2019, in province p 
during month m. specification 3 we add linear regional time trend to account for regional-time 
varying effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province level.  Significance level: *** 0.1%; 
** 1%; * 5%; +10%. 
Note: In November 2019, the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants was equal to 10.0. Average 
mobility in March 20 was lower than that of November 19 by 17.4 percentage points. 
 
We now use the discrete mobility indexes and exploit information on the number of calls for all 
the months between November 2019 and July 2020. We measure the effect of the intensity of the 
mobility restrictions by comparing two groups of provinces (which are fixed over time). We first 
plot the average number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants between November 2019 and July 2020 
for the high intensity mobility restriction provinces and low intensity mobility restriction 
provinces, for both definitions of the discrete mobility index ( Figure  e and Figure  f) 
As can be seen in the two figures, formal mobility was equally restricted everywhere during the 
initial phase of the lockdown measures. As a result, the number of calls increased in all provinces 
after the implementation of the quarantine. However, the number of calls increased more in the 
provinces with the highest effective mobility restriction, which suggests that differences in the 
help-seeking behavior of IPV victims partially reflect differences in the intensity of effective 
mobility restriction during the confinement.  The difference in trends is neater for provinces with 
the most extreme mobility restriction (Figure  f).  
Estimates from our main specifications are presented in Table 3 below (additional specifications 




descriptive graphs, which is that province-level differences in terms of effective mobility 
restrictions reflect province-level differences in the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims. The 
number of calls to 016 per 100,000 inhabitants significantly increased in all provinces after the 
implementation of the policy compared to the pre-policy period (post coefficient):   by 3.56 when 
considering the 1st definition of high intensity mobility restriction (specification 1) , and by 3.79 
using the 2nd definition (specification 3). This result is very close to the results we found using the 
difference-in-differences specification, which are presented Table 1. 
Furthermore, this increase was significantly higher for provinces with the highest mobility 
restriction intensity. In our main specifications – 1 and 3 - we measure that the additional effect 
of belonging to the high intensity mobility restriction group (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 coefficient) is equal to 
1.06 (respectively 1.43), which is equivalent to an effect of the pandemic being 29.7 pp (resp. 37.7 
pp) higher in high intensity mobility restriction provinces compared to low intensity mobility 
restriction provinces. The additional increase in pp in high intensity mobility restriction provinces 
points 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝/𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚 is robust to alternative specifications.  
Plots of the coefficient estimates from the event study models (Figure  g) show that the higher 
number of calls to 016 per 100,000 inhabitants in high intensity mobility restriction provinces do 
not steam from pre-confinement differences between the two groups, since coefficients associated 
with lags are non-statistically different from 0. We also find that this additional effect of effective 
mobility restriction persists in the medium term -  at t+2 in May, and t+2 and t+3 when we use the 





Table 3 - Estimation of the impact of mobility on the number of calls to 016 per 100,000 
inhabitants, discrete mobility indexes (main specifications) 
Definition of high intensity 
mobility restriction 
1st: mobility during quarantine 
below average 
2nd: mobility during quarantine 
below the 25th percentile  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specifications Main model Controlling for 
deaths during 
Covid-19 




1.06+ 1.10+ 1.43+ 1.46+ 
(0.60) (0.61) (0.74) (0.74) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 
3.56*** 3.56*** 3.79*** 3.80*** 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.51) (0.51) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎𝑫𝑴𝑰𝒑/𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 0.297 0.309 0.377 0.384 
 𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑   
 -0.00  -0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Intercept 
9.38*** 9.39*** 9.38*** 9.39*** 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Obs. 467 467 467 467 
R2 0.483 0.484 0.486 0.486 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Region FE No Yes No No 
Time frame Nov 19 – July 2020 Nov 19 – July 2020 
𝑫𝑴𝑰𝒑 is equal to 1 for provinces belonging to the high mobility restriction intensity group, 0 otherwise. 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the months between April and July 2020; 0.5 for March 
2020; 0 otherwise. 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎𝑫𝑴𝑰𝒑 is the coefficient of interest, which captures the additional effect of 
belonging to a high mobility restriction intensity group after the pandemic outbreak. It is highlighted in bold 
(interaction coefficient).  𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐𝒎,𝒑  is the excess in deaths in 2020 compared to 2019, in province p during 
month m. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. 
Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%.  
Note: the average number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants in February 2020 is equal to 8.6 
 
4.3 Incidence of COVID-19 and help-seeking behavior at the local level 
We now explore the health impact of the COVID-19 incidence at the province-level on the number 
of calls to 016. Plots of the number of calls associated with the number of new cases (Figure  i) or 
deaths due to COVID-19 (Figure  j) for the 52 provinces between March and July 2020 indicate a 
negative but small relationship between the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims and the 




When we run the OLS regression (equation (6)) and control for province and month fixed effects, 
we find no significant effect of the intensity of the pandemic on the number of calls per 100,000 
inhabitants (Table 4). This result holds when we measure the intensity of the health effects using 
either the new number of confirmed cases or a measure of COVID-19 mortality, and when we run 
alternative specifications.  
Table 4 - Effect of the pandemic on the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants  
𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝒊:  𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫
𝟏: new confirmed COVID-19 
cases per 100,000 inhabitants 
𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝟐: excess in deaths compared to 
2019 per 100,000 inhabitants 
Specifications 















0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Intercept 
10.30*** -725.17*** 14.63*** 10.56*** 7.74*** 14.54*** 
(0.37) (98.90) (0.56) (0.26) (0.77) (0.53) 
Observations 259 259 208 259 259 208 
R2 0.250 0.283 0.017 0.251 0.280 0.015 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time frame March – July 2020 
Apr – July 
2020 
March – July 2020 
Apr – July 
2020 
𝑪𝑶𝑽𝑰𝑫𝒊 is the health indicator of interest used in the regression: either the number of new confirmed 
COVID-19 cases, or the excess in deaths in 2020 compared to 2019. It is indicated in bold on the first 
line of the table. Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; +10%.  
Note: In March 2020, the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants was equal to 10.6; the number of new 
confirmed cases per 100,000 inhabitants was equal to 380; the estimated deaths due to COVID-19 per 
100,000 inhabitants was equal to 33. 
5 The effect of quarantine on third party reporting 
We now investigate whether the effect of the quarantine measures on the number of calls that we 
have documented in the previous sections might steam from changes in third party reporting 
rather than change from victims' reporting. Calls by victims represent, on average, 67% of all calls 
to 016 between January 2019 and July 2020. The share of non-victims’ calls slightly decreases 
after March 2020 (Figure  k), which suggests that third party reporting is unlikely to be the main 
driver of our results.   
We present the estimation results of our main specifications (equations (1), (3), (4), (6)) when 
calls to 016 are restricted to victims’ calls in Table  e and Table  f. We find that the implementation 
of the quarantine measures caused an increase of 2.60 in the number of calls per 100,000 




of callers are considered23. Likewise, the magnitude of the effect of the continuous mobility 
variable on the number of calls when only victims’ calls are considered (-0.11) represents 58% of 
the effect measured when all calls are considered (-0.19)24.  We also measure that belonging to 
the very high mobility restriction intensity group increases the effect of the pandemic by 37pp 
compared to low mobility restriction intensity provinces25, which is very close to the result that 
we obtain when considering all calls.  
6 Conclusion 
We find that the implementation of the lockdown policy was associated with a 41% increase in 
the number of calls to the domestic violence emergency hotline compared to the pre-policy period. 
This effect was stronger in April, during which the entire Spanish territory was under strict 
confinement. However, our results also show evidence that the implementation of the lockdown 
policy affected the help-seeking behavior of IPV victims in the medium term, after quarantine was 
lifted.  
We find that the effect of the policy is stronger in provinces whose effective mobility reduction 
was more intense (because of differences in quarantine compliance, deconfinement measures, 
demographic or labor characteristics, etc…). More specifically, we measure that a 10% decrease 
in the share of the mobile population is associated with an additional 1.9 calls per 100,000 
inhabitants. We also find that the effect of the pandemic outbreak is between 30 to 38 percentage 
points higher in provinces with the most intense mobility reduction during the quarantine.  We 
provide evidence that our results are not driven by an increase in third party reporting. Given the 
difficulties for domestic violence victims to seek help when confined with their partner our results 
likely underestimate the real increase in domestic violence incidents.  
The intensity and long-lasting effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown policy on the 
incidence of domestic violence that we document in this paper points to the crucial importance of 
implementing measures to detect and protect potential domestic violence victims, in particular in 
 
 
23 3.52, Table 1 
24 It should be noted that the coefficients of interest for the continuous mobility regression (specification 
1,Table  f) and the 1st discrete mobility regression (specification 2, Table  f) are not statistically significant, 
which likely steams from the limited availability of mobility data for the months prior to the implementation 
of confinement measures. Their magnitude is nevertheless close to previous estimates. 




view of the recent increases in the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in several countries 






Aizer, A. (2010) ‘The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence’, American Economic Review, 
100(4), pp. 1847–59. doi: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1847. 
Anderberg, D. et al. (2016) ‘Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence’, 
Economic Journal, 126(597), pp. 1947–1979. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12246. 
Arenas-Arroyo, E., Fernandez-Kranz, D. and Nollenberger, N. (2020) ‘Can’t Leave You Now ! 
Intimate Partner Violence under Forced Coexistence and Economic Uncertainty’, IZA Discussion 
Paper, (13570). 
Beland, L.-P. et al. (2020) ‘COVID-19, Family Stress and Domestic Violence: Remote Work, 
Isolation and Bargaining Power’, IZA Discussion Papers, (13332). Available at: 
https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/13332/covid-19-family-stress-and-domestic-violence-
remote-work-isolation-and-bargaining-power. 
Campedelli, G. M., Aziani, A. and Favarin, S. (2020) ‘Exploring the Effect of 2019-nCoV Containment 
Policies on Crime: The Case of Los Angeles’, pp. 1–49. doi: 10.31219/osf.io/gcpq8. 
Card, D. and Dahl, G. B. (2011) ‘Family violence and football: The effect of unexpected emotional 
cues on violent behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), pp. 103–143. doi: 
10.1093/qje/qjr001. 
Kumar, A. and Nayar, K. R. (2020) ‘COVID 19 and its mental health consequences’, Journal of 
mental health (Abingdon, England). Routledge, 0(0), pp. 1–2. doi: 
10.1080/09638237.2020.1757052. 
Leslie, E. and Wilson, R. (2020) ‘Sheltering in place and domestic violence: Evidence from calls for 
service during COVID-19’, Journal of Public Economics. Elsevier B.V., 189, p. 104241. doi: 
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104241. 
Lindo, J. M., Schaller, J. and Hansen, B. (2018) ‘Caution! Men not at work: Gender-specific labor 
market conditions and child maltreatment’, Journal of Public Economics. Elsevier B.V., 163, pp. 77–
98. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.007. 
Mazza, M. et al. (2020) ‘Danger in danger: Interpersonal violence during COVID-19 quarantine’, 
Psychiatry Research. Elsevier Ireland Ltd, 289(April), p. 113046. doi: 
10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113046. 




Global Development, (528), p. 43. 
Piquero, A. R. et al. (2020) ‘Staying Home, Staying Safe? A Short-Term Analysis of COVID-19 on 
Dallas Domestic Violence’, American Journal of Criminal Justice. American Journal of Criminal 







8.1 Timeline of the lockdown measures in Spain 
With the implementation of the lockdown on the 15th of March 2020, mobility was limited to 
essential needs and restrictions included the closure of bars, restaurants, night clubs, movie 
theatres and theatres, etc. Furthermore, while the majority of countries maintained authorization 
to go outside for physical activity or stroll around, even at the highest peak of the pandemic 
(particularly for families with children), in the Spanish case this was not allowed until two months 
later, during the 1st phase of the deconfinement measures.  
 After nearly two months of lockdown under those strict conditions, on April 28th, the government 
announced the Spanish deconfinement plan organized in four different progressive phases. In the 
1st and 2nd phase residents were allowed to gather in groups of no more than 10 people (15 in 
the 2nd), practice physical activity or walk outside at specific hours, attend outside events, go to 
the library, attend places of cult. Museums, theatres, restaurants, shops were also progressively 
allowed to open under limited capacity (50%). In the 3rd and last phase, restrictions on the 
duration and time to go outside were lifted. Some restrictions on group gatherings and capacities 
were maintained to allow for social distancing). 
Progressive deconfinement measures were implemented at different times and under different 
conditions across the Spanish territory. Between the 11th of May and the 18th of May, 70% of all 
Spanish provinces entered the 1st deconfinement phase, which allowed limited outside activities 
and small group gatherings.  On the other hand, the most strongly hit autonomous communities 
(Barcelona, Madrid, and part of the region of Castilla La Mancha) remained in the initial phase of 
the quarantine longer than the others, until the 25th of May (later for some provinces). Additional 
protective measures were also taken during the progressive deconfinement phases in Barcelona 
and Madrid, where mobility to and from the two areas was monitored while bars, restaurants, 
museums, etc. were allowed to open.   
8.2 Additional information on data sources and indicators 
Mobility  
We formally define the continuous mobility indicator as:  











With 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝,𝑚,𝑑  the share of the mobile population in province p, during day d of month m; 𝑑𝑚 
is the number of days in month m; and 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑝,𝑟𝑒𝑓 is the share of the mobile population in 
province p during the reference period.  
We formally define DMI as follows:  
(8)          𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝 <  𝛼
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝  ≥  𝛼
 
With 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝 the average value of the continuous mobility index of province p between March and 
June 2020; and 𝛼 the chosen threshold (average value of 𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼 or low 25th percentile of  𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼 
over all provinces).  
Deaths due to COVID-19 
Since the COVID-19 outbreak, the INE has been publishing weekly data on the estimations of the 
number of deaths for all causes, with the objective of supporting research on the spread and health 
impact of the pandemic at a detailed – province -  and frequent  - weekly -  level. Data is available 
for deaths that occurred during the pandemic from March 2020 onwards, but also for previous 
years (2000 to 2019) in order to identify and measure the abnormal pattern of mortality caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
In our analyses, we use as proxy for the deaths due to COVID-19 in a given province p and month 
m, the difference between the number of deaths for all causes of mortality observed during this 
month and the number of deaths in the same province p and month m in 2019, which we denote 
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑝,𝑚
2.   
Figure  c plots the number of observed deaths during the COVID-19 outbreak for all causes of 
mortality (black line), and the estimated deaths in the absence of COVID-19 as calculated by the 
ISCIII26: the highest number of estimated deaths due to COVID-19 was registered 10 days after the 





26 This estimation is not available at the province level, which is why we use the number of deaths in 2019 




8.3 Additional tables and figures 
Figure  a- Changes in mobility between March 16th of 2020 and June 18th of 2020 in the entire 
Spanish territory, in % 
 
Source: INE, Statistical information for the analysis of the COVID-19 crisis’ impact.  Share of the 
population which left its residential area during the day for at least two hours.  
Figure  b– Daily number of new confirmed COVID-19 cases (left axis) and cumulated cases in Spain 
(right axis), between the 31st of January and the 26th of July
 
Source : Health institute Carlos III, https://momo.isciii.es/public/momo/  (last accessed 
05/08/2020). 
 Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (grey vertical line). The first 
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Figure  c– Estimated deaths without COVID-19 and observed deaths during COVID-19 in Spain, 
between the 31st of January and the 26th of July 
 
Source : Health Institute Carlos III, National Center of Epidemiology (ISCIII-CNE), 
https://cnecovid.isciii.es/covid19/ (last accessed 05/08/2020).  
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (grey vertical line). The first 
deconfinement policies were implemented on May 11th (blue vertical line). 
Figure  d– Calls to 016 per month in different CCAA, in 2020 and 2019 
 
Source: Government Office on Gender-based Violence.  
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (red vertical line), and partially 
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Table  a- Number of calls to 016 per 100,000 inhabitants in Spain, per month and year 
 
Month 2019 2020 
January 8.9 9.3 
February 8.1 8.6 
March 9.3 10.6 
April 9.0 14.2 
May 10.1 14.0 
June 9.9 13.7 
July 10.8 13.5 
August 11.3 10.6 
September 9.8  
November 10.0  
December 10.2  
Source: Government Office on Gender-based Violence.  
 










November (reference month) 26.9%   0.0% 
March  9.5% -17.4% 
April 8.6% -18.3% 
May 12.6% -14.3% 
June 16.6% -10.3% 
Source : INE, Statistical information for the analysis of the COVID-19 crisis’ impact. Mobility data.  
Note: the continuous mobility index is the difference between the share of the mobile population in the 





Table  c– List of provinces in high and low mobility restriction groups, according to the definition 
of the discrete mobility index 
 
1st definition of high intensity mobility 
restriction: mobility during confinement 
below average 
Average mobility restriction between March and June = -15.1 
2nd definition of high intensity mobility 
restriction: mobility during confinement 
below 25th percentile 
25p of mobility restriction between March and June = -17.4  
High intensity mobility 
restriction  
Low intensity mobility 
restriction  
High intensity mobility 
restriction  
Low intensity mobility 
restriction  
ALBACETE ALMERIA ALBACETE BARCELONA 
ALICANTE BADAJOZ ALICANTE BIZKAIA 
ASTURIAS BALEARES ALMERIA CANTABRIA 
BARCELONA BURGOS ASTURIAS CEUTA 
BIZKAIA CIUDAD REAL BADAJOZ GIPUZKOA 
CANTABRIA A CORUÑA BALEARES GUADALAJARA 
CASTELLON CUENCA BURGOS LEON 
CEUTA CACERES CASTELLON MADRID 
GIPUZKOA CADIZ CIUDAD REAL MELILLA 
GUADALAJARA CORDOBA A CORUÑA NAVARRA 
LA RIOJA GIRONA CUENCA PALENCIA 
LAS PALMAS GRANADA CACERES SEGOVIA 
LEON HUELVA CADIZ ZARAGOZA 
LLEIDA HUESCA CORDOBA 
 
MADRID JAEN GIRONA 
 
MELILLA LUGO GRANADA 
 
NAVARRA MURCIA HUELVA 
 
PALENCIA MALAGA HUESCA 
 
SALAMANCA OURENSE JAEN 
 
SEGOVIA PONTEVEDRA LA RIOJA 
 
TARRAGONA SEVILLA LAS PALMAS  
TENERIFE SORIA LLEIDA 
 


























































Figure  e – Evolution of the number of calls between high intensity (below average) and low 
intensity (above average) mobility restriction provinces: 1st definition 
 
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (red vertical line), and 
partially lifted on the 11th of May. The number of calls indicated each month corresponds to the 
total number of calls at the end of the month.  
Figure  f– Evolution of the number of calls between very high (low 25%) and low intensity mobility 
restriction provinces (top 75%): 2nd definition 
 
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (red vertical line), and 
partially lifted on the 11th of May. The number of calls indicated each month corresponds to the 




Table  d- Estimation of the impact of mobility on the number of calls to 016 per 100,000 
inhabitants, discrete mobility indexes (alternative specifications) 
 
Definition of high mobility 
restriction 
Average continuous mobility 
below average 
Average continuous mobility is the 
low 25th percentile 
Specifications 










2.03** 0.80+ 1.88* 1.05+ 
(0.59) (0.47) (0.72) (0.56) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 
4.88*** 2.38*** 5.03*** 2.56*** 
(0.66) (0.38) (0.76) (0.37) 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎𝑫𝑴𝑰𝒑/𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 0.416 0.336 0.374 0.410 
Intercept 
232.86*** 9.33*** 171.16** 9.33*** 
(51.16) (0.25) (61.71) (0.25) 
Obs. 467 675 467 675 
R2 0.522 0.387 0.521 0.388 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes No Yes 










𝑫𝑴𝑰𝒑 is equal to 1 for provinces belonging to the high mobility restriction intensity group, 0 otherwise.  
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒚,𝒎 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for the months between April and July 2020; 0.5 for March 
2020; 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. The coefficient of interest in all 
specifications is highlighted in bold (interaction coefficient).   
Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%.  






Figure  g– Event study estimates of high mobility restriction vs.  low mobility restriction on the 
number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the definition oh high mobility restriction 
intensity 
 
1st definition: mobility during confinement below 
average 
2nd definition: mobility during confinement below low 
25th percentile 
  
Note: coefficient estimates are indicated for each lag/lead around the confinement 
implementation (t+0) indicated as a vertical grey line. Confidence interval (95%) are plotted 





Figure  h – Scatterplot of the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants and the percentage of the 
mobile population, In November 2019 and between March and June 2020 
 
Figure  i– Scatterplots of the number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants and the number of Covid-19 






Figure  j- Scatterplots of the number of new calls per 100,000 inhabitants and the difference in the 
number of deaths with 2019 (March – July 2020)
 
 
Table  e -  Effect of the quarantine on the number of calls by victims only, difference in difference 
estimates for the main specification 
   















Month FE Yes 
Province FE Yes 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator which is equal to 1 for the months between April and July; 05 for March; 0 otherwise. 𝑇 
is the treatment dummy which is equal to 1 for the year 2020. The DiD coefficient (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑇) is indicated in 
bold for all specifications.  Standard errors are clustered at the province level.  
Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; +10%.  





Table  f – Effect of mobility on the number of calls by victims only, for the main specifications 
 
Continuous mobility estimates Discrete mobility estimates 
(1)  (2) (3) 
 
Def. of high mobility 
restriction intensity 
provinces:  




















(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) 
Observations 259 Observations 467 467 
R2 0.297 R2 0.445 0.447 
Month FE Yes Month FE Yes Yes 





Nov 19  
July 20 
Nov 19  
July 20 
𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑝,𝑚 is the continuous mobility index. 𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑝 is the discrete mobility index, which takes the value of 1 for 
provinces in the high mobility restriction intensity group, 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑦,𝑚 is a dummy variable which 
is equal to 1 for the months between April and July 2020; 0.5 for March 2020; 0 otherwise. Standard errors 
are clustered at the province level. The coefficient of interest in all specifications is highlighted in bold 
(interaction coefficient).  Significance level: *** 0.1%; ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%.  
Note: the average number of calls per 100,000 inhabitants is equal to 10.0 in November 2019 (reference month 






Figure  k – Number of calls between January 2019 and July 2020, by type of caller  
 
Source: Government Office on Gender-based Violence.  
Note: Lockdown was implemented nationally on the 15th of March (black vertical line), and 
partially lifted on the 18th of May. The number of calls indicated each month corresponds to the 
total number of calls at the end of the month.  
Figure  l - Share of population moving out of its residency area, average over week of 18th of 
November 2019
 




Figure  m - Share of population moving out of its residency area, 1st of April 2020
 
Source: INE, Statistical information for the analysis of the COVID-19 crisis’ impact. Mobility data.  
 
Figure  n-Share of population moving out of its residency area, 1st of May 2020
 




Figure  o -Share of population moving out of its residency area, 1st of June 2020   
 
Source: INE, Statistical information for the analysis of the COVID-19 crisis’ impact. Mobility data.  
 
Figure  p -Share of population moving out of its residency area, 20th of June 2020
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